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Antitrust: Fear of Fairness
In December 1985, a comprehensive Reagan administration plan for both substantive and procedural reform of the antitrust laws was made
public. Under the plan, the Justice Department's 1984 merger guidelines would be codified in the Clayton Act; restrictions on interlocking directorates would be relaxed; industries affected by imports could seek antitrust
waivers as an alternative to tariffs or quotas;
plaintiffs could be assessed attorneys' fees for
filing frivolous antitrust suits; treble damages
would be eliminated in many cases; and the full
share of damages of settling defendants (instead of just the settlement amount) would be
deducted from the damages available against
the remaining defendants. While not as sweeping a reform as some administration officials
would have liked-Commerce Secretary Malcolm Baldrige, for instance, has publicly called
for outright repeal of the Clayton Act-the proposal is the most important to come along in
many years.
Congress is also considering some less dramatic proposals for antitrust reform. On July
29 the Senate Judiciary Committee held a hear-

S

and other readers of Regulation
magazine will want to join the staff of the American Enterprise Institute in acknowledging with
great appreciation the magazine's chief editors,
Anne E. Brunsdale and Walter Olson, as they
depart for new positions.
Anne Brunsdale, the managing editor and an
AEI senior fellow, helped to launch Regulation
in 1977. She has been nominated by President
Reagan to serve on the U.S. International Trade
Commission. With her recent confirmation by
the Senate, she has begun a term that will expire
in 1993. Under Brunsdale's direction the maga-

ing on S. 1300, a bill that would largely abolish
joint and several liability in antitrust suits alleging "horizontal" price-fixing conspiracies.
The bill has eleven sponsors on the Judiciary

Committee, including all eight Republicans, and
counts among its supporters former Carter administration attorney general Griffin Bell, the
Antitrust Section of the American Bar Association, and virtually all major business lobbies.
Joint and several liability has long been a
controversial part of antitrust law. Courts decided early in this century that antitrust plaintiffs not only could sue any or all of the potential defendants in a conspiracy case but could
also collect their damages after trial from
whomever and in whatever proportions they
chose. The Supreme Court further confirmed in
1981 that antitrust defendants have no "right of
contribution" against each other, so that if one
defendant is forced to pay more than its seemingly fair share of the damages from a conspiracy, it cannot countersue its co-conspirators.
In suits involving multiple defendants,
each defendant is thus potentially liable for all
the damages alleged to have resulted from the
entire conspiracy. Not surprisingly, this figure
-or even each defendant's arithmetic share of

zine gained a reputation for reliability and analytical rigor, qualities not always found in a
journal as highly praised for its readability as
Regulation.
Walter Olson, associate editor since 1980, has
maintained these high standards both in his
editing and in his writing. He has accepted a
position with the Manhattan Institute, in New
York City, as vice president for research.
The special niche that Regulation occupies in
the national policy community is a tribute to the
expert guidance of these two editors. We wish
them well in their new endeavors.
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it--often exceeds the net worth of many small,
and sometimes not-so-small, defendants. S. 1300
would limit any single firm's liability in such
cases to the (treble) damages attributable to
its own sales or purchases, except for portions
of the total damages attributable to firms that
are bankrupt or beyond the jurisdiction of
American courts.
The existing combination of joint and several liability, treble damages, and the payment
of attorneys' fees to winning plaintiffs (but not
defendants) creates perverse incentives for
both sides in antitrust litigation. The huge potential losses to individual defendants encourage marginal or even "strike" suits filed in hope
of squeezing settlements from defendants. Many
managements are understandably reluctant to
bet their firms by contesting such suits, even if
they believe the grounds to be meritless, on the
expectation that a jury will properly assess the
complex evidence involved.
Once the suit is filed, the present liability
rules, especially joint and several liability, create a dangerous litigation dynamic. When one
alleged conspirator settles, it can dramatically
increase the potential liability of the others.
Only the amount for which the defendant settles, not its proportionate share of the damages,
gets subtracted from the remaining liability.
For example, with ten defendants and $1 billion in potential damages, each defendant has
an average expected maximum liability of $100
million. (It is, of course, in the plaintiff's interest to announce that he will be utterly arbitrary
in apportioning damages, so that each defendant must contemplate the prospect of getting
stuck with the full bill. A very small chance of
corporate obliteration can weigh quite heavily
at settlement conferences.) But if five defendants settle for $10 million each, the five remaining defendants face exposure 'of $950 million,
or $190 million apiece, nearly double the original amount. And if nine defendants settle at $10
million each, the lone remaining defendant can
be left holding a $910 million bag.
The result can be virtually irresistible pressure to settle even a frivolous lawsuit so long
as the potential exposure is great enough. The
first defendants to settle-not improbably, the
guiltiest among them-will bail out at bargain
rates, leaving the remaining defendants, the
ones more inclined to fight the charge, in a
steadily worsening bargaining position-unless
6
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they join the race to surrender. The effect is to
create what the American Bar Association's Antitrust Section has called "a litigation posture
that precludes the assertion of innocence."
Such problems can arise even in cases
where the potential damages are relatively
Small (although multi-billion-dollar damage
projections are becoming almost routine in major cases). The critical figure, from a psychological if not fiscal standpoint, may not be so
much the total dollar amount of exposure as the
ratio of that exposure to a firm's net worth. A
small firm roped in as a defendant in an antitrust conspiracy almost surely faces potential
bankruptcy if it fights alone and loses, perhaps
just from the legal fees. Indeed, it can be wiped
out by the legal fees even if it wins. The mere
pendency of a killer suit can thus have a devastating impact on a firm's credit rating.
The preamble to the bill says that its point
is "to assure fairness in the allocation and
award of antitrust damages." One body that
does not feel swayed by that argument is the
Justice Department, which 'testified in opposition to the bill. Charles Rule, then acting assistant attorney general for the Justice Department's antitrust division, memorably explained
why: "it is difficult to quantify the benefits to
society from being `fair' to antitrust felons."
"Antitrust defendants who truly deserve to
be treated `fairly,' " Rule said-"persons engaged in procompetitive or competitively ambiguous conduct-would seldom be able to
invoke S. 1300." Instead, the administration
testified, the beneficiaries of the bill "would
be that class of antitrust defendants who least
engage our sympathy: those accused of horizontal conspiracies affecting price. These violations are clearly anticompetitive, intentionally
committed, and criminal in nature" [emphasis
added].
Although the notion that the scope of punishment raises no issues of fairness is a provocative one, the deftest part of this logic is
surely its leap from allegation to proof. Perhaps we now know who planted the idea with
the attorney general that all suspects are guilty.
Conspicuously absent from the administration's testimony is any acknowledgment of the
problems of harassment and strike suits. The
effects of S. 1300 would be principally felt not
after a trial and verdict of guilty, but at the
pretrial stage, when corporate officers decide
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whether to fight or Settle. While it may be too
much to expect the ABA's Antitrust Section to
tackle the problem of excessive lawyering, one
iS surprised to see the Reagan administration
Justice Department ignoring the tactical implications of giving nuclear weapons to the plaintiffs' bar.
The administration's general antitrust reform package contains some balm for defendants. For example, the elimination of treble
damages in many actions (though not price-fixing suits) would go far toward removing some
of the perverse litigation incentives that now
exist. More important is the administration's
proposal on claim reduction: when one defendant settles, that defendant's share of the originally sought damages is deducted from the
remaining total. The pressure on remaining defendants to settle would thus be substantially
lessened, though far from eliminated.
If the administration's package is not the
last word in antitrust reform, neither is S. 1300.
The bill limits a defendant's liability to damages attributable to its "purchases or sales,"
which, as the administration pointed out, would
exempt from liability participants in bid-rigging conspiracies who purchase or sell nothing,
but merely agree not to bid. As written, the bill
would deny victorious plaintiffs recovery of
their costs and attorneys' fees, though one can
argue about whether this is really a problem
for anyone outside the legal profession. Finally,
it would not apply to vertical "conspiracies,"
which by now most antitrust scholars as well as
the administration view as frequently procompetitive.

The Glacial Water Project
Unlike Solomon Grundy, born on Monday and
deceased by Sunday next, many public works
projects seem to have unnaturally protracted
life histories. One such is the Garrison Diversion
project, a scheme dreamed up back in the 1940s
to spend $1.2 billion irrigating North Dakota
farmland. In 1965 Dakota politicians finally got
Congress to authorize the project, but lawmakers have never been able to reach agreement on
whether to go ahead and finish it, though the
Bureau of Reclamation has spent $213 million

building preliminary canals and other structures. Faced with continued political stalemate,
Congress in 1984 created a blue-ribbon commission to review the project's future, its
twelve members appointed by Interior Secretary William Clark.
Appointed commissioners, no matter what
the color of their ribbons, are subject to the
same interest-group pressures as mortal legislators. In December 1984 the Garrison commission came out with recommendations that could
serve as a model of the typical outcome of such
pressures. The commission recommended a
compromise plan that on the one hand would
scale back the project, but on the other hand
would spend so much to buy off the political
opposition that it would save little or no money.
The Garrison Diversion project is a massive webbing of canals, reservoirs, and dams to
supply North Dakota farmland with water diverted from the Missouri River, which runs
through the middle of the state. North Dakota
politicians aver that in 1944, when the government built Garrison Dam on the Missouri as
part of the Pick-Sloan power project, Congress
promised to build the diversion project to
"make up for" having flooded thousands of
acres with the dam. No such promise is recorded in the legislative history of the Pick-Sloan
project, nor would one seem to be called for by
ordinary standards of compensation, since the
acreage flooded was first duly purchased from
its owners, and since those owners are in any
case not the same people who would be helped
by the diversion scheme. A "sense of the Congress" resolution passed in 1984, however, insisted that a moral commitment had been made.
The Bureau of Reclamation's cost-benefit
studies leading to authorization in 1965 and updated since then have always been favorable,
and financial studies have shown that the project's beneficiaries, the landowners whose properties would be irrigated, would reap enough
profit that they could afford to repay the project's operating as well as some of its capital
costs. The investigating commission found that
view far too optimistic: the beneficiaries would
be unlikely to be able to repay even their operating costs. The bureau's favorable findings to
the contrary, commission hearings revealed,
had been based on extremely unrealistic assumptions. It was assumed, for example, that
half of one district would be planted in potaREGULATION, NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1985
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In BriefUpdate: No Extra Cancer in TMI's
Wake. A study by the Pennsylvania
Department of Health has found no
evidence that the Three Mile Island
nuclear accident led to any increase
in cancer incidence among its
neighbors. The department found
that, for the area within a ten-mile
radius of the TMI plant, there have
been 2,892 deaths from cancer since
1979, slightly fewer than the 2,909
that would be statistically expected. The death rate was also within
the expected range in a larger radius of twenty miles from the plant,
as well as in a smaller group of
"downwind communities" immediately adjacent to the plant.
The word on new cases of cancer
diagnosed since the accident, as
distinct from deaths, was also reassuring. There were twelve more
new cancer cases in the downwind
areas between July 1982 and June
1984 than would have been expected
(133 instead of 121.4), but the difference is not statistically significant,
and the dozen "extra" cases do not
fall into any category associated
with TMI. "While Newberry Township appeared to have ten more
cases than might have been expected," said state health secretary Dr.
H. Arnold Muller, "virtually all of
the discrepancy (nine of the ten)
involved non-radiogenic cancers, or
those not generally associated with
radiation."
Residents had been alarmed by
an earlier survey conducted by a
local couple that purported to find
a dramatic rise in cancer deaths
"clearly tied to the TMI-2 accident."
According to the state researchers,
the earlier survey attributed to TMI
the deaths of people who had been
diagnosed with cancer before the
accident, people who were mistak-

enly counted as residents of the
survey area, and long-term heavy
smokers who died of lung cancer.
The earlier survey was also found
to have been biased in its selection
methods: in one neighborhood of
fourteen streets, it had canvassed
each of four streets where a cancer
death had occurred, skipping each
of the ten where none was found.
Specials of the Day: Bean Pilaf
and Cod Sushi. For some time
there have been proliferating in the
fifty state capitals not only "buyAmerican" but also "buy-in-state"
laws. The latter direct state agencies and contractors to retaliate
against the predatory and unconscionable trade practices of the
Outer Forty-Nine. It is usually futile to complain about these trade-

barriers-by-any-other-name, because jobs are thought to be involved, and anyway a state's inherent right to erect such barriers
is what the Constitution (well, all
right, the Articles of Confederation) is all about.
One of the odder buy-in-state
campaigns is currently under way
in Massachusetts. Local activists
have long been alarmed that their
heavily urbanized and poor-in-topsoil state falls far short of agricultural self-sufficiency, as if the state
were likely to fall victim to an Organization of Potato Exporting Countries led by Maine and Idaho. Now
they have convinced the state government to do something about it.
The state Department of Agriculture is passing out subsidies to
bring fresh local tomatoes to
market, organizing taste-ins to promote local apple wines, and even
giving restaurants grants to redo
menus using local products. Director Gus Schumacher refuses to attend dinners or events where the
food is not largely locally grown.
Even if this campaign succeeds
in pulling a Silicon-Valley-in-re-

toes, while the commission concluded that in
fact only 5 to 6 percent of the acreage in question might economically produce that crop.
A whole book could be written about the
fanciful interest rates assumed when public
works projects are put through putative cost8

AEI JOURNAL ON GOVERNMENT AND SOCIETY

verse by replacing the state's numerous electronics plants with orchards, there are no grounds for
expecting anyone to be satisfied.
After all, as Iowa farmers could
tell them, being self-sufficient in
food is no guarantee of prosperity.
Coercion in Canada. Critics of the
U.S, medical system often complain that doctors are "maldistributed," with too many choosing to
practice in suburbs and downtowns
while too few practice in slums and
rural areas. Various levels of government have set up incentive
schemes to lure physicians to areas
deemed "underserved," but there
have often been hints of sticks that
might be used some time in the future should the carrots prove insufficient.
In Canada, the future has arrived. The province of British Columbia is now telling doctors where
they may and may not set up practice, according to a report in the
Wall Street Journal. The enforcement mechanism is simple enough.
The provincial government health
insurance scheme merely refuses
to issue billing authorization to
doctors opening new practices in
the forbidden zone, which includes
Vancouver and other popular areas.
With the only big city in the province off-limits, that means new doctors must inevitably locate in the
cold and remote hinterlands. "It
ties us to the soil like serfs," complains an official of the doctors' association.
The medical group has challenged
the new law in court on the
grounds that the constitution protects the right to live and work
where one wishes. Not that the doctors are any paragons of libertarian principle: according to the Journal report, they propose as an alternative that the government restrict medical students while leaving existing doctors alone.

benefit analyses. In this case, even assuming a
rock-bottom 31/s percent nominal rate of interest, the commission concluded that every dollar
of expenditure on the original irrigation project
would yield back merely twenty-nine cents in
benefits.
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Nonetheless, the commission proposed not
to abandon the project but to build a smaller
alternative that would irrigate 114,000 acres instead of 250,000. The junior-sized version would
serve 400 farms of about 300 acres each at a
capital cost of $5,414 per acre or $1.65 million
per farm. (Subsequent recalculations by the
Bureau of Reclamation have cast doubt on these
cost estimates, forecasting a cost overrun of
$262 million above the authorized ceiling of $1.1
billion. The projected annual benefit would
amount to $23,600 per farm, which works out
to a nominal annual rate of return of just under
1.5 percent.
The recipient farmers would pay almost
none of the project's total cost. Under the commission's plan, 99 percent of it would be paid
by customers of the Pick-Sloan power project.
These customers would lose in another way,
because taking water flow out of the power system for purposes of irrigation would reduce the
hydroelectric power available for Pick-Sloan
users. The market value of that power is at least
$30,000 per year for each newly irrigated farm,
a cost that itself exceeds the project's benefit to
farmers, but that the commission did not consider.
To compensate the state of North Dakota
for the loss of the extra irrigation, the commission also proposed spending $400 million to
bring improved water supplies to 150,000 families in and around 130 widely scattered small
towns in the state. Interestingly, the relevant
federal guidelines allow planners to skip benefit-cost analyses for projects bringing domestic
water to communities of fewer than 10,000 persons; in those cases, planners may simply assume that benefits equal costs. Needless to say,
the Garrison commission took full advantage of
this provision.
And a good thing too. Again assuming the
scanty 31/8 percent rate of interest, each family
would have to pay $45 a month to reimburse
the $400 million in capital and operating costs.
Since a study by the state of North Dakota
found that comparable farm families can pay
no more than $15 per month to switch from
wells to centralized water supplies, there is no
reason to expect this part of the outlay to be
paid back either. Furthermore, the state of
North Dakota has already come up with a
cheaper proposal for supplying many rural families with domestic water. In short, both North

Dakota and the rest of us might be better off if
the state were simply given $300 or $400 million
with no strings attached to buy off its demands.
When bargains are made with water as the currency, however, no substitutes will apparently
be tolerated; it is water or nothing.
The domestic water quid pro quo raises
other serious issues too. Under a 1958 law municipal and industrial users, unlike agricultural
users, have always been charged rates high
enough to pay back water subsidies with interest on capital expenditures, reckoned at the
Treasury's long-term bond rate (currently
above 10 percent) as well as operating and
maintenance costs.
The commission got around this obstacle
by recommending that users pay only 10 percent of the cost of providing the household water supplies. The remainder would be made up
by tapping revenues from power provided by
the Pick-Sloan project, which currently are
scheduled to repay Garrison construction costs.
The Office of Management and Budget says that
to do this will mean raising rates to Pick-Sloan
users. The commission also recommended that
interest charges on the domestic water project
be set at the same fictitious 31/8 percent rate as
the irrigation project-an unprecedented boon
for a nonagricultural water project. This would
leave U.S. taxpayers to bear a $100 million interest subsidy.
While the commission recommended building a less ambitious irrigation system, it shied
away from the unpleasant task of proposing
that the remainder of the original plan actually
be dropped from the authorization. Instead, it
would leave the unfunded portions-some $533
million worth--on the statute books where they
could be funded by some future Congress.
The Garrison commission is being suggested as a model for resolving stalemates on
other water projects. Presumably future commissions will operate within the same constraints, such as the notion-borne out in the
cases of Tennessee-Tombigbee and Tellico, as
well as Garrison--that once authorized, a water
project should be considered a moral commitment, never to be surrendered but for the ransoms of Araby.
The major pressure against these projects,
which is environmental rather than financial, is
at best sporadic. Environmental organizations
have their own interests to pursue, and are not
REGULATION, NOVEMBER/DECEMBER 1985
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reliable opponents of the pork barrel as such.
The Audubon Society is fighting one aspect of
the compromise settlement, the continued authorization of the full project. But it reportedly
approves of the costly domestic water plan as a
way to muster the political support to preserve
wetlands by scaling back the scope of the proj-

who has ever visited Canada, especially its western provinces, will remember seeing-well, a lot
of trees. One might even observe that, when it
comes to lumber, Canada has a comparative
advantage over other countries. This may help
explain why the Canadian government lets its
citizens (though not foreigners) chop down
ect.
trees on public lands for a very low price-conEven this flurry of compromise may not be duct that could be stigmatized as illegal under
enough, it turns out, to get Garrison finished. the proposed bills.
The states that now benefit from Pick-Sloan
Of course, just as even paranoids may have
power may object to having to make up their real enemies, so even a country with naturally
losses, and Congress still has to authorize any cheap raw materials may be going out of its way
scheme to reallocate power revenues. Whatever to make them even cheaper. Prohibitions on the
the reason, more than a year after the commis- export of raw materials and "two-tier" price
sion's work the political glacier has not melted schemes with preferences for certain industries
and Garrison's future remains unresolved.
may confer artificial advantages on a country's
export of manufactures, advantages that are in
fact regarded as outright subsidies.
The countervailing-duty policies of this
country, however, never have attempted to
Nature's Own Subsidies?
trace and cancel out all foreign subsidies; that
Most economists, whatever their other differ- would require trying to estimate the net impact
ences, agree that the cornerstone of the inter- of hundreds of general government policies on
national trading system is the idea of compara- an exporter, comparing them with a mythical
tive advantage. To the economic mind the ma- undistorted equilibrium. Instead the United
jestic fjords of Norway, the verdant meadows States, in coordination with most other develof New Zealand, and the exotic avian fauna of oped nations, has mainly gone for a quick kill of
the Galapagos are mere instances of unequal obvious subsidies, in particular those that difactor endowments, leading inevitably to sur- rectly benefit exports, at the cost of letting some
pluses of hydropower, mutton, and guano suit- subtler but real subsidies go uncountervailed.
able for trading. Were such endowments not The process has surely been influenced by the
unequal, there would be little point to trading fact that, in the view of many respectable obanything: we might as well resign ourselves to servers, it is not always in our best interest to
retaliate against subsidies in the first place,
self-sufficiency.
whether direct or indirect. It is probably ininterest
that
of
particular
therefore
It is
fluenced even more strongly by the fact that the
Capitol
initiative
on
the latest protectionist
Hill inadvertently threatens to define compara- United States itself carries on virtually every
tive advantage itself as an unfair trade prac- sort of indirect subsidy that one can name. It
tice. A group of bills headed by H.R. 2451 (Rep. uses cheap water and research to subsidize farm
Gibbons, Democrat, Florida) and H.R. 1950 exports; it has embargoed the sale of various
(Rep. Guarini, Democrat, New Jersey) would raw materials, including logs from public lands,
expand the Tariff Act of 1930 to require the in order to help processors; and, like most othDepartment of Commerce to levy countervail- er countries, it restricts mining by foreigners
ing duties against "natural resource subsidies" on public lands.
Up to now, the United States has followed
by foreign governments. Such subsidies would
exist whenever a foreign government sold a the general rule of imposing countervailing
natural resource product to its own citizens at duties only on practices that confer a special
a price below "fair market value," unless it also advantage on a specific industry or group of
offered the product to U.S. firms on the same industries or that directly benefit exports. The
distinction is best understood in the negative:
terms.
The most often cited example of such a re- a bounty or grant that is available to all is not
(Continues on page 43)
source is Canadian timberlands. Now, anyone
10
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Nature's Own Subsidies?
(Continued from page 10)
counteravailable. If the Canadian government
wishes to establish roads, schools, or investment tax credits that are available to all, it may,
even if one or another industry derives unusual benefit from those expenditures.
The Commerce Department is already embroiled in difficulties in determining even this
level of subsidy. It would really be in the soup
if it also had to determine the "fair market
value" of the inputs foreign companies use. Under the proposed legislation, the department
would have to take into account a long list of
factors in assessing this fair market value, of
which comparative advantage is supposed to be
one (though only one). This raises the prospect
of a trading world in which foreign exporters
can go on selling at low prices only if a squad
of Washington functionaries is convinced that
Nature, and not a government, is at the root of
their economical production.
The U.S. Court of International Trade,
which regularly second-guesses the Commerce
Department on these matters, has already
stepped into the arena of natural resource subsidies. It recently held that Pemex, the Mexican
national oil company, was unfairly subsidizing
certain Mexican manufacturers when it provided them with petroleum byproducts at cut
rates.
The current U.S. policy of attacking only
certain kinds of subsidies conforms to the rules
of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade,
and in particular the Subsidies Code agreed to
at the Tokyo Round of trade negotiations. The
proposed bills are almost certainly subject to
successful challenge under GATT. If that happens, our trading partners would be authorized
to retaliate against U.S. exports, especially, of
course, the exports that are traceable to our
own bounteous natural resources, which could
be hit with countervailing duties. We know this
sort of retaliation to be effective because we
have invoked such measures ourselves: American gourmets are currently paying an additional 40 percent duty on imported pasta because
the European Economic Community restricts
imports of U.S. citrus and walnuts. As it turns
out, Canada is the best market for U.S. exports
--which suggests another reason for U.S. policy
makers to exercise caution.
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